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1.  Introduction: Historicist Objections and the Realist Defenses 
The most reasonable recent strategy for defending scientific realism seems to be the well-known Boyd-Putnam ‘no-miracle-argument’. On this view, the evident empirical success of current physical theory in mature sciences is taken to provide good reason for believing in the truth, or approximate truth, of the theory’s claims about unobservable entities and processes. Success is taken as compelling evidence for truth, because the realist hypothesis that successful theories are true provides the only, or at least the best, explanation of the fact that they are successful, and increasingly so. The great success of current scientific theories in contexts of prediction, explanation, and technical control would be a miracle without the assumption that such theories are effectively tracking the truth.  So the ‘no-miracle argument’ goes!
	In the last few decades, powerful philosophical challenges have been raised against this explanationist defense of realism. Does realism provide the best explanation of the success of science? Do we get a comparable, or better explanation, in terms of the empirical adequacy, rather than truth, of successful theories? Even if truth offers the best explanation of success, does it also confirm scientific realism? Is such ‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ a reliable principle of scientific confirmation? In any case, isn’t it patently question-begging in the context of justifying scientific realism? All scientific theories exhibit some mixture of empirical success and failure. What counts as the degree of success that is supposed to betoken truth? If theories can mismatch observed phenomena in certain respects and yet count as approximately true, is this notion of truth sufficiently rigorous and intelligible for a robust realism? Is approximate truth just another term for falsehood, or perhaps, a special class of falsehoods that are useful for certain scientific purposes?
	In this paper, I focus on the challenge to explanationist realism based on claims concerning the history of science in the work of Kuhn, Larry Laudan, and others, and on the strategies adopted by realists to counter the historicist challenge. I will argue that these strategies raise difficulties for explanationist realists that question the way they read the history of science and how they use it to vindicate their position. In the end, my criticisms of explanationist realism motivate not anti-realism, but the exploration of a different explanationist strategy for realists. 

2. Anti-Realist History of Science and Psillos’ Realist Rebuttal 
The historicist challenge to explanationist realism receives its canonical formulation in Laudan’s work (1981, 19-49). His argument begins with the evident fact that in the history of science, many theories, such as the ether theories of the 19th century, enjoyed substantial empirical success, despite the fact that to the best of our knowledge, they are false. Indeed, in some cases, wholly false—not even approximately true—because the unobservable entities they posited (e.g., the luminiferous ether) are not just mischaracterized, but do not exist. If false theories can be empirically successful, then the realist’s truth-based explanation of success is a non-starter and the explanationist defense of realism comes unglued. Furthermore, if past successful theories are false, it is likely that currently successful theories are false; indeed wholly false—not even approximately true—because in all probability the entities to which they refer do not exist, just as in the past cases. This ‘pessimistic induction’ from past cases of successful-but-false theories to the status of current theory, bodes ill for explanationist realism. It undermines not just the realists’ view that currently successful theories are approximately true, but their view that the greater success of current theories shows that they are more truth-like than their less successful predecessors. On Laudan’s reading, the history of science exhibits a series of more or less successful but false theories with little continuity or cumulatively in their ontological commitments and truth-content. From this relentlessly anti-realist perspective, true theories, or ever more truth-like theories, are simply not something science can achieve.
	In a recent work, Psillos (1999, 105) accepts the full measure of this challenge, arguing that scientific realism must and can be refashioned to accommodate the empirical failure, and discontinuity of conceptual and ontological commitment, so evident in the history of science. Building carefully on the work of other realists, Psillos defends three strategies for the revision of explanationist realism in order to accommodate historical aspects of scientific practice and yet blunt the force of Laudan’s anti-realist argument. First, Psillos’ strategy (1999, 105-08) is to tighten the realist’s criterion of empirical success by requiring that successful theories are not just fashioned to imply already known phenomena, but also yield novel predictions in a non-ad hoc manner. The adoption of a novel-prediction standard of empirical success is intended to yield a much smaller class of genuinely successful theories than Laudan’s historical argument assumes. This strategy thus reduces the set of discredited theories to which the realist will awkwardly have to attribute truth. As such, it also decreases the historical evidence for Laudan’s pessimistic meta-induction to the likelihood that currently successful theories are false.
	Psillos recognizes, however, that there remain historical cases of theories that are false but successful by the novel prediction standard. On his second strategy, he concedes that the empirical success of a theory should not be taken by the realist as evidence that all its components are true or even approximately true. By this strategy, realists can accommodate the fact that even genuinely successful theories are false, in the sense that they have false components. Nonetheless, for the realist, success still betokens truth, for successful theories have true components that drive their success (Psillos 1999, 115-45). 
	While these two strategies may blunt the force of some of Laudan’s historical cases, Psillos (1999, 113-14, 290-92) acknowledges that there still remain cases of genuinely successful theories (such as the ether theory of light propagation) whose essential success-creating components (e.g., the luminiferous ether) seem to refer to non-existent entities (the ether), to be wholly false, and to be entirely replaced by current theory (e.g., the electromagnetic field). Building on other realists’ contributions, Psillos’ third strategy involves the development of a theory of reference that avoids Laudan’s anti-realist account of these historical cases. 
	Drawing on elements of causal and descriptive conceptions of reference, Psillos (1999, 280-300) defends a theory of reference that establishes continuity of reference and commensurability between genuinely successful theories in a given area of scientific inquiry as it changes over time.  I explain and evaluate it below.  This strategy works against Laudan’s history by securing realist continuity of reference, commensurability, and progress in the truth-likeness of outdated theories, that appear non-referring and completely false, by Laudan’s lights.
	Psillos thus brings together and refines the most powerful realist strategies for blunting the historicist challenge to explanationist realism. In what follows, I argue that the cogency of these realist strategies (i) depends on a flawed notion of empirical success at odds with other realist arguments, and (ii) that the richer notion of empirical success implied by other realist arguments undermines the plausibility of Psillos’ defense of scientific realism as the explanation for the empirical success of scientific theories. 

3.  A Close Look at the Novel-Prediction Standard  

	The realist seeks a rigorous standard of empirical success to avoid having to count as successful and true past physical theories that we take to be false. To this end, Psillos (1999, 105-07) adopts a novel-prediction standard on which a successful theory must predict phenomena that exhibit either ‘temporal’ novelty or ‘use’ novelty or both—that is, either ‘new’ phenomena that are unknown when the theory is first advanced or ‘new’ phenomena known to exist but not used or accommodated in the design of the theory when it is first introduced, or both. On this standard, while many past theories exhibited the ability to ‘save the phenomena’, such bare empirical adequacy is insufficient for genuine empirical success, and confirmation of a theory.
	Psillos’ embracing of a novel-prediction standard of empirical success is vulnerable to three immediate objections, which are the subject of the rest of this section.  Moreover, in the next section, we will see that these first three concerns give rise to another, more fundamental problem with explanationist realism.  
	First, the novel-prediction standard seems ad hoc in the sense that it lacks the naturalistic grounding in scientific practice that is supposed to justify the explanationist realists’ use of inference-to-the-best-explanation (or IBE). Explanationists adopt a naturalistic stance in epistemology and claim that their scientific realism is a scientific hypothesis justified by the very sort of abductive inference (IBE) effectively employed by scientists in producing knowledge (Psillos 1999, 71, 78-79, 179).
	Yet many scientists and philosophers of science have rejected a novel-prediction standard on the reasonable grounds that how well a theory explains, or is confirmed by, a body of evidence should not depend on the accidental matter of when the evidence is discovered or when the theory is constructed or modified to account for the evidence (Psillos 1999, 76-78). Our confidence in a theory grows as it is successfully extended to new domains and problem-areas, including the novel discoveries to which it may lead. But this does not imply that new evidence does or should count more than old evidence just because it is ‘new’. Rather, confidence in the theory may increase simply because there is more evidence in its favor, or a wider range of different kinds of evidence, or a broader explanatory power and scope, than that previously obtained. Though this situation typically takes time, if it were to occur instantaneously, and a great variety of evidence were ‘in’ but ‘old’, the theory would be rightly regarded as the height of empirical success, and very well-confirmed, independently of ‘novel predictions’ in Psillos’ sense. Of course, this instantly successful theory would not then be idle or useless; it could be effectively employed to explain, predict, or control future instances of the same kinds of phenomena it was successfully designed to explain and predict.  For all these reasons, the novel prediction standard is a dubious criterion of empirical success or confirmation, and lacks any convincing naturalistic justification. 
	The second difficulty for this standard follows on the first. If I am right, it will come as no surprise that explanationists do not use a novel-prediction standard in giving their own naturalistic justification of scientific realism. Psillos and other explanationists clearly assume that the ability of their theory of scientific realism, properly formulated, instantaneously to explain already well-known phenomena—the success of science—can confirm it and make it empirically successful, independently of novel prediction. What novel predictions do scientific realists make? Realists treat IBE in scientific and everyday reasoning as wholly reliable without novel prediction (Psillos 1999,70-71. 78-79). Indeed, in his critique of van Fraassen, Psillos (1999, 211-12) takes great pains to establish that such abductive inference, with or without novel prediction, fully confirms scientific hypotheses just as it does in cases of everyday hypotheses. Psillos’ adoption of a novel-prediction standard of empirical success is thus inconsistent with these other fundamental features of his and other standard realist accounts and seems to be an ad hoc maneuver against Laudan with little independent theoretical grounding in the former’s general account of scientific inference.
	The third and most important difficulty concerns the whole notion of empirical success employed by realists. On the one hand, realists would like to make empirical success a simple, one-dimensional, unproblematic feature of science. As such, it is taken to refer to the ‘instrumental reliability’ of theories in predicting and controlling observational phenomena (Psillos 1999, 78-79). Psillos’ novel-prediction standard is meant to be a more stringent version of such instrumental reliability. On the other hand, realists like Psillos also hold that the empirical success of science consists in the ability of its best theories to explain, not merely to predict, save or imply the phenomena. Furthermore, they hold that there are multiple standards and dimensions of a theory’s explanatory power: following Psillos, its simplicity, consilience, the breadth and scope of what it explains, completeness, indirect theoretical support, intuitive plausibility based on background knowledge, and empirical adequacy or accuracy. And the presence of these explanatory virtues is necessary for the confirmation of the theory, as Psillos explicitly argues (1999, 171).
	Anti-realists treat all of these explanatory virtues as merely pragmatic; i.e., virtues of a theory that are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. Realists regard the presence of such explanatory virtues in a theory as confirmatory, reasons for taking the theory to be true or approximately truePsillos 1999, 171). These explanatory virtues are sometimes described as a theory’s  ‘super-empirical’ virtues. But this description is misleading for the realist if it is taken to imply that a theory can lack such explanatory virtues and still be empirically successful. For, as I read IBE realism, observational phenomena confirm a theory and count as evidence for it if and only if the theory provides the best explanation of the phenomena, and possesses the requisite explanatory virtues. As a result, realism is committed to the identification of empirical success with explanatory success. Furthermore, because explanatory success requires far more than empirical adequacy, instrumental reliability, or novel prediction, it is explanatory success, rather than empirical adequacy, that the hypothesis of scientific realism must explain. This result generates the third difficulty with Psillos’ ‘novel prediction’ strategy for blunting Laudan’s historicist challenge to realism.
	As we have seen, Psillos embraces the novel-prediction standard of success to narrow the historical set of superceded theories that the realist will have to count as empirically successful and thus true. But if empirical success is explanatory success, then on Psillos’ own account, there are multiple standards and dimensions of every theory’s explanatory virtue and empirical success. In order to determine the empirical success of any given theory, the realist will need to evaluate its on-balance, overall explanatory power: its simplicity, consilience, completeness, indirect theoretical support, intuitive plausibility based on the background knowledge of its exponents, and empirical adequacy. As a result, the cases of allegedly successful-but-false theories cited by Laudan, and rejected by Psillos, (e.g., Le Sage and Hartley’s contact-action gravitational ether theory), may well have satisfied most of the realist’s standards of empirical success, even if Psillos is right that it failed, or fared poorly, on the novel-prediction standard (1999, 101-05). Arguably, the gravitational ether theory provided a simple, consilient, intuitively plausible explanation for a wide range of phenomena that otherwise could not be explained at the time. Empirical success in science always involves some such trade-offs in the matter of which standards or explanatory requirements a successful theory satisfies, at the expense of which others. Once Laudan’s examples of allegedly successful-but-false theories are evaluated by the realist’s full set of standards for success, Psillos’ narrowing strategy seems weak and unconvincing, since it depends on ignoring all but one criterion and dimension of success—novel prediction—and a dubious one at best. 
	But my claim that explanationist realism is committed to the identification of empirical with explanatory success raises a fundamental difficulty for explanationism per se. I now turn to this difficulty.

4.  Empirical Adequacy and Explanatory Success
On my argument so far, what the hypothesis of scientific realism has to explain is the explanatory adequacy of successful theories. If empirical success is explanatory success, then what realism must explain is why a theory succeeds in producing a simple, unifying, consilient, intuitively plausible, and empirical adequate explanation of phenomena. But the realist explanation—it succeeds because it is true—fails to provide a plausible explanation of the theory’s simplicity, consilience, intuitive plausibility, and unifying power. After all, can realism just assume that the truth or approximate truth concerning the unobservable causes or dynamics of phenomena is always simple, consilient, intuitively plausible, etc? Yet without such ‘metaphysical’ assumptions, how can the realist hypothesis, e.g., that theory T is true, possibly explain the fact that T is a simple, consilient, or plausible theory? 
	Faced with this difficulty, the explanationist may insist that it is enough if realism provides the best explanation of what is admittedly only one dimension, though a fundamental one, of a theory’s success: the fact that it is empirically adequate, instrumentally reliable, or a good predictor of novel phenomena. If this much suffices to establish scientific realism, why worry about how to explain theories’ other virtues? Yet this defense of scientific realism seems to create more miracles than it dissolves! Is it just a lucky accident that true theories turn out to be simple, consilient, unifying, and plausible, as well as empirically adequate? If these were mere pragmatic virtues, as van Fraassen holds, then the realist could relegate these aspects of theory to historical or social contingencies to be explained by social scientists or historians. 
	But the realist takes these explanatory virtues to be confirmatory, and thus linked to the truth of a theory. This is the key point. Shouldn’t any (realist) explanation of science aiming to vindicate the truth claims of theories have the ability to explain all or most of the features of theories taken to confirm their truth or approximate truth, i.e., all their truth-linked properties? Doesn’t realism, treated naturalistically as a scientific hypothesis, need to possess the same completeness, unifying power, consilience, and empirical adequacy that it finds in successful scientific theories, more generally? For this reason, a defense of scientific realism as the explanation of empirical adequacy alone weakens its explanatory and scientific credentials. 
		But there is a deeper problem with Psillos’ defense of scientific realism. Can explanationist realists embrace any notion of empirical adequacy or instrumental reliability that is logically independent of explanatory success? If we think of a theory in the classical way as a hypothetico-deductive system, we can similarly think of its empirical adequacy or instrumental reliability as a function of the extent to which it yields true observational implications, or predictions. As such, its empirical adequacy would be logically distinct from other explanatory virtues. Yet this way of representing theories generates one of the most powerful arguments against realism—the argument concerning the underdetermination of theories by evidence, so central to the position of anti-realist instrumentalists and empiricists. Theories that make incompatible claims concerning unobservables can be observationally equivalent, implying all and only the same observational consequences. Given this possibility, it is unreasonable to take a theory’s observational consequences, or empirical adequacy, as evidence that the theory is true, so goes the anti-realist argument (or one version of it) (Psillos 1999, 162-68). 
	Realists have responded in various ways to the argument. But a favorite realist response, embraced by Psillos (1999, 168-76), is to deny that observational equivalence is evidential or epistemic equivalence. On this view, a theory’s true observational consequences do not necessarily confirm it because logical relations are not necessarily evidential or confirmational. For IBE realists, it is natural to hold that a theory’s observational consequences only count as evidence for the truth of the theory if it provides a plausible, or the best explanation of these observations. Thus, observationally equivalent theories need not be evidentially and confirmationally equivalent. This current realist response to the underdetermination argument links the very notion of empirical success to that of explanatory success. To be sure, we could continue to identify empirical success with the logical power of a theory to imply true observational consequences. But this logical trait of a theory will not support the realist inference to its truth, because the realist refuses to make this inference (or give the same explanation) in the case of incompatible but observationally equivalent theories.
	Thus the very notion of empirical adequacy required by the realist inference, from success to truth, cannot be the narrow logical notion. It must be the richer epistemic notion of explanatory adequacy or success, which the realist needs against the underdetermination argument. As a result, even if we would allow a defense of realism as the best explanation of empirical success by itself, this notion must be linked to explanatory success, so that it is consistent with realism’s refusal to treat observationally equivalent theories as equally empirically successful and well-confirmed (Psillos 1999, 172-74).
	My conclusion is that what the scientific realist needs to but cannot explain is the explanatory success of theories; why theories succeed in producing simple, consilient, intuitively plausible, unifying, and complete accounts of observed phenomena, or accounts with many of these virtues. Against realism, I have argued that the truth of a theory provides a very weak, implausible explanation of its explanatory virtues. I have also argued that this multi-dimensional notion of empirical success (as explanatory success) weakens Psillos’ ‘narrowing’ strategy for blunting Laudan’s challenge. The realist will have to attribute truth to many of Laudan’s false-but-successful theories that Psillos hoped to exclude by his novel-prediction standard. This only strengthens the evidence for the pessimistic induction to the falsity of currently successful theories. 

5.  The Partial Truth Of Theories: Psillos´ Second Strategy

	Even if the realist can reasonably narrow the range of genuinely successful superceded theories, undoubtedly there will remain some of Laudan´s ´false-but-successful` cases. Psillos´ second strategy of response is to restrict the realist committment of truth to those and only those components of a theory that are genuinely responsible for its empirical success (1999, 108-14). The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the identification of empirical success with novel prediction, making the strategy vulnerable to the above criticisms of the novel prediction standard. Focussing on but one possible standard and dimension of success (novel prediction), Psillos can plausibly argue that a successful theory (e.g. the caloric theory of heat) had components (e.g. the existence and causal role of the caloric) which did not play any essential role in producing its success (e.g. the novel prediction of calorimetric laws such as the conservation of heat) (Psillos 1999, 113, 115-18).
	This strategy weakens considerably as soon as we recognize that these supposedly inessential or idle components (e.g. the caloric) may have played an essential role in ennabling the theory to fulfill the realist´s other standards and dimensions of empirical success (e.g. the role of the caloric in providing a simple, consilient, intuitively plausible, causal explanation for a wide variety of heat phenomena). Of course, even with multiple dimensions of a theory´s explanatory success in play, some components of a theory may be idle and serve no useful explanatory purpose. But because scientists are on the whole rational, it is fair to assume that the various components of a theory are mostly functioning to ennable scientists to realize one or more of the multiple standards of explanatory success. To return to Psillos´ example, suppose he is right that the caloric theory´s assumptions concerning the existence and causal role of the caloric play no essential role in driving the theory´s `novel´ prediction of calorimetric laws such  as the conservation of heat. Nonetheless, the caloric is arguably essential to the theory´s  ability to explain these laws in a simple, consilient, and intuitively plausible manner, given reasonable background beliefs that heat phenomena required a material cause with powers like those attributed to the caloric. 
	Given realists´ committment to multiple criteria and dimensions of explanatory success, a certain skepticism arises concerning Psillos´ second strategy of neatly distinguishing between the parts of a theory which do and these which do not contribute to its success. The realist is thus still in the awkward position of having to attribute truth either to whole theories, or components of theories (e.g. the caloric) which are false, to the best of our knowledge. Laudan´s challenge is so far undiminished. 

6. Realism and Continuity of Reference

	Psillos recognizes that the realist´s first two strategies cannot succeed in overturning all of Laudan´s  historical cases. In particular, he acknowledges that there remain genuinely successful theories whose success requires the postulation of entities and mechanisms that do not exist, to the best of our knowledge. His example is the ether theory of light propagation whose empirical success, he grants, requires the posit of a luminiferous ether to explain the observable phenomena concerning the behavior of light (Psillos 1999, 114, 130-40). This theory seems to be conceptually and ontologically incommensurable with the theory of the electromagnetic field which supercedes it. That is, the successor theory does not appear to be a correction and improvement of its predecessor (Psillos 1999, 137-40, 280-81).  Rather the successor seems to simply reject in toto the conceptual and ontological committments of its predecessor, replacing them with entirely different ones. From the standpoint of current knowledge, how can the realist attribute any truth or truth-likeness to the superceded theory, successful though it may have been, if it now seems to have been predicated on referential failure?
	Psillos´ third strategy is to establish sufficient continuity of reference between successful theories such that the appearance of total referential failure is dissolved and the possibility of a superceded theory´s approximate truth is restored. His strategy builds on causal and descriptive accounts of reference, aiming to combine elements of each into a plausible realist theory of reference for scientific concepts (1999, 281-93). On his theory, two theoretical terms L (the luminiferous ether) and E (the electromagnetic field) refer to the same entity only if there is some overlap in the kind-constitutive properties attributed to L and E by their respective theories in virtue of which each is taken to play a causal role in bringing about the effects both theories seek to explain. Furthermore, we utilize current theoretical knowledge – our most-successful theory – to determine what the real referrent is (e.g. the electromagnetic field), what properties it really has, and what really causally produced the outdated referential acts (references to the ether) (1999, 293-300). 
	By this route, Psillos seeks to show that ether theorists´ concept of a luminiferous ether succeeded in referring to the electromagnetic field. Though they made many mistakes about the cause of light propagation, they were right in their assumption that there is a cause and in some of their assumptions concerning the causal powers that it would have to possess in order to bring about and explain these effects (Psillos 1999, 296-97). This ennables the realist to appeal to these true or truth-like components of the ether theory in order to explain its empirical success. Moreover, it allows the realist to characterize the current theory as a more successful and thus more truth-like account of the very same things that its predecessor also referred to, but with less success and approximate truth. 
	The difficulty is that this realist account of reference works against the realist explanation of success. As I argue above, for the realist, empirical success must be explanatory success, which is what the realist has to explain. But the realist may be unable to explain the explanatory success of a theory, if its reference is fixed not by its own explanatory structure of hypotheses, but by that of the current theory. For example, Psillos´ realist wants to explain the success of the ether theory of light propagation – why it succeeded in giving a simple, consilient, intuitively plausible, complete, and/or empirically adequate account of light phenomena, or some light phenomena, in any case. Presumably, these dimensions of explanatory success were driven by the assumptions of its advocates concerning the properties of the luminiferous ether. Though most of these assumptions are false by the standards of current knowledge, these assumptions provided the luminiferous ether with its explanatory power, in the context of the background beliefs which shaped the reasoning of its exponents. For the realist, intuitive plausibility – one dimension of explanatory success – is clearly a function of such background beliefs in the historical context. 
	If ´luminiferous ether` refers to the electromagnetic field, this implies the falsity of most of those assumptions about the ether that enabled it to function as a simple, plausible, consilient, adequate explanation of light phenomena in its time and place.  But then, the scientific realist cannot explain the theory´s  success.  In sum, the realist is hardpressed to explain the explanatory success of theories within the constraints of his or her ´whiggish` theory of reference. On the other hand, if realists preserve their explanatory resources by allowing the truth-likeness of a successful theory´s assumptions to fix reference, then they lose continuity of reference. 
	Thus the realist is more or less stuck having to explain the success of theories whose success depended on component claims, posits, and terms that are non-referring and false, by the lights of current theoretical knowledge. Psillos´ theory of reference does not succeed in meeting Laudan’s challenges any more than his first and second ´narrowing` strategies do. 


7. An Alternative Explanationist Realism
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